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Abstract
AKgrowthmodelspredictthatpermanentchangesingovernmentpoliciesaffecting
investment rates should lead to permanent changes in a country’s GDP growth.
Charles Jones (1995) sees no evidence for this prediction in data for 15 OECD
countries after World War II: rates of investment, especially for equipment, have
risen while GDP growth rates have not. This article provides evidence supporting
the AK models’ prediction. Data back to the 19th century show a strong positive
relationship between investment rates and growth rates and short-lived deviations
from trends. A strong positive relationship also exists between average rates of
investment and growth in postwar data for a large cross-section of countries. To
account for the short-run deviations in rates that Jones highlights, the model he
used is extended to allow policies to affect not only investment/output ratios but
also capital/output ratios and labor/leisure decisions.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Over the past 200 years, many countries have experienced
sustained growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita. Accounting for this sustained growth has been a
central goal of modern economic growth theory. Early
modelssimplyassumedsomepositiverateoftechnological
progress which translated into positive GDP growth. Now
models havebeendeveloped thatgenerategrowthendoge-
nously. One class of such models, commonly called AK
models,
1 relies on the assumption that returns to capital do
not diminish as the capital stock increases. Without dimin-
ishing returns, a country with a high stock of capital is not
deterred from continued investment and, therefore, contin-
ued growth.
The AK class of models has been heavily criticized.
Most critics have attacked the main assumption, the ab-
senceofdiminishingreturns,ashavinglittleempiricalsup-
port.
2 However, such criticisms are themselves difficult to
support if capital is viewed broadly to include human cap-
ital and intangible capital, both of which are difficult to
measure. More serious critiques analyze the testable pre-
dictions of AK models. Jones (1995), for example, argues
that a key prediction of AK models is inconsistent with the
data. Unlike the earlier exogenous growth models, AK
modelspredictthatpermanentchangesingovernmentpol-
icies affecting investment rates should lead to permanent
changes in a country’s GDP growth. Jones tests this pre-
diction by comparing investment as a share of GDP and
the growth rate of GDP for 15 countries that belong to the
OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment
(OECD). Using data for the post–World War II period,
Jones (1995) argues that AK models are inconsistent with
thetimeseriesevidencebecauseduringthepostwarperiod,
rates of investment, especially for equipment, have in-
creased signiﬁcantly, while GDP growth rates have not.
Here I defend AK growth models against that critique:
I demonstrate that the key prediction of AK theory is con-
sistent with the data. Using historical data going back to
the 19th century, I show that the patterns Jones points to—
episodes in whichinvestment rates rose while growthrates
remainedconstantorfell—wereshort-lived.Yetthesimple
model Jones tests predicts not short-run patterns, but long-
run trends. The longer time series show that periods of
high investment rates roughly coincide with periods of
high growth rates, just as AK models predict. This is true
for OECD countries and for three Asian non-OECD coun-
tries for which historical data are available. A positive re-
lationship is also clear in the data for a larger number of
countries than Jones examines. Cross-sectional data for a
rangeofcountriesatdifferentstagesofdevelopmentreveal
a strong positive relationship between average investment
rates and average growth rates, again, just as AK models
predict.
To account for the short-run deviations that Jones ﬁnds
in investment and growth trends, I consider a version of an
AK-style model that is slightly more general than the one
he tests. The version Jones tests assumes that government
policies affecting investment and growth do not affect key
factors like capital/output ratios or labor/leisure decisions.
Since those factors are not changing, the model predicts a
stark relationship between the rate of physical investment
and growth: they should move in lockstep. If, instead, the
model assumes that these factors are affected by changes
in government policies, then the model does not necessari-
ly predict that growth rates will change one-for-one with
investment rates. I construct simple examples in which
changes in policy variables directly affect capital/output
ratiosandthelabor/leisuretradeoff.TheseAK-stylemodels
can predict deviations in trends of investment rates and
growth rates consistent with the patterns in postwar data.
Basic Theory
To start, let’s look at several simple AK growth models to
highlight the link between investment rates and growth
rates that this class of models predicts. As we shall see, the
simplest versions of AK models imply a tight positive re-
lationship between investment as a share of output and the
growth rate of output.
Consider a simple AK model of growth. The model has
a representative household that chooses per capita con-
sumption c and per capita investment x in each period to
maximize lifetime utility U; that is,
(1) max{ct,x t} t=0b
tU(ct)
for 0 < b < 1, where t is an index for time. The optimiza-
tion problem (1) is subject to a resource constraint, a capi-
tal accumulation constraint, and inequality constraints:
(2) ct + xt = Akt
(3) kt+1 = (1−d)kt + xt
(4) ct ³ 0 and xt ³ 0
given k0, where kt is the stock of capital at time t, A is the
level of technology, and d is the rate of depreciation of the
capital stock. Per capita output in this model is simply
(5) yt = Akt.
The production technology in equation (2) has constant
returns to scale; clearly, doubling the stock of capital dou-
blesoutput.Withoutdiminishingreturnstoscale,acountry
with ahighstockofcapitalwillcontinuetoinvestandcon-
tinue to grow. To justify the constant returns assumption,
we typically interpret the capital stock as a broad measure
thatincludesnotonlyphysicalcapital,butalsohumancap-
ital and intangible capital.
If the level of technology does not change over time,
then in this simple version of the model, the growth rate of
output equals the growth rate of the capital stock. If we di-
vide both sides of equation (3) by the current capital stock
kt, then we have
(6) gt =1−d + xt/kt
(7) gt =1−d + Axt/yt
wheregtisthegrowthrateofcapitalandofoutputattime t.
Equation (7) illustrates the tight link predicted between the
investmentrateandoutputgrowth.Thistheorypredictsthat
sustained increases in the investment/output ratio should
be accompanied by sustained increases in the growth rate
of output.
Nowlet’sextendthemodelslightly.Asnotedabove,the
capitalstockintheAKmodelisusuallyinterpretedbroadly.
If we include the components separately in the model, butstillretainthelinearstructure,weendupwiththesameim-
plications for investment and growth.
To see this, consider an extension of the model above
which includes, explicitly, both physical and human capi-
tal. Let k denote the stock of physical capital and h denote
the stock of human capital, with xk and xh denoting the in-
vestments in the two stocks. Now the problem is to max-
imize the utility in (1) subject to
(8) ct + xkt + xht = Ak
a
th
1
t
−a
(9) kt+1 = (1−d)kt + xkt
(10) ht+1 = (1−d)ht + xht
(11) ct ³ 0, xkt ³ 0, and xht ³ 0
where a is the share of physical capital in production. For
simplicity, assume that both types of capital depreciate at
the same rate d. In this example, output is given by
(12) y = Ak
ah
1−a
where the exponents on the two accumulable factors sum
to 1. Here, as before, doubling the capital stocks doubles
output.
In this model, households choose investments so as to
achieve a constant ratio of human to physical capital. This
is the ratio of the components’ relative shares: (1−a)/a.
Thus, total output can be written as a linear function of k,
or as
(13) Ak
ah
1−a = A[(1−a)/a]
1−ak
and the growth rate of output still equals the growth rate
of physical capital. From (9), we can derive the growth
rate of physical capital by dividing both sides of the equa-
tion by kt.I fh/k does not start at (1−a)/a, it rapidly ad-
justs to this ratio if the inequalities in (11) are not binding.
After the adjustment, the variables c, xk,x h,k ,and h all
grow at a constant rate g. This rate is given by
(14) g =1−d + xk/k =1−d + A[(1−a)/a]
1−axk/y.
Here again we ﬁnd a tight link between the rate of physi-
cal investment and growth.
The two models we have considered are special cases
of the broad class of AK models that allow for sustained
growth in consumption, capital, and output. In these mod-
els, the production technology either was linear (y=Ak)o r
had constant returns in accumulable factors (y = Ak
ah
1−a).
In such cases, the link between investment and growth can
be made very stark. However, a strong link remains in AK
models even with more general production technologies,
y=f(k), that have the property that limk®¥f¢(k)=A.I fA >
d, then the model generates sustained growth. (For more
details on the mathematics, see Jones and Manuelli 1990.)
This speciﬁcation of the production function still implies
thatreturnstocapitalareboundedbelow.Thus,highercap-
ital stocks do not deter a country from further investment,
and higher investment implies higher growth rates.
Finally, wecouldextendthemodelabitmorebyallow-
ing for a more general industrial speciﬁcation. Typical in
the growth literature is a model in which different types of
capital are produced in different sectors of the economy. A
standard assumption is that production of human capital
requires a different type of technology than production of
consumption or physical investment goods. For example,
the main input to production of investment of human capi-
tal might be assumed to be human capital (teachers) rather
than physical capital (buildings). Assuming different tech-
nologiesallowsformoreﬂexibilityinthemodel,butitdoes
notchangethemodel’smainimplication:Investmentisthe
engineofgrowth.Ifinvestmentratesarehigh,growthrates
should be too.
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A Case Against AK Theory
Jones (1995) argues that this main implication of AK mod-
els is not supported by the data. In particular, he points out
that while investment/output ratios have risen in many
countriesoverthepostwarperiod,outputgrowthrateshave
stayed roughly constant or have fallen.
The evidence Jones (1995) uses to make a case against
AK theory is summarized in Tables 1–3. In Table 1 are
ﬁve-year growth rates of GDP per worker for eight OECD
countries.4 The growth rates have been annualized and are
reported for the period 1950–89. These data show that in
these countries, over these 40 years, growth rates have
fallen somewhat or have remained roughly constant. Ja-
pan, for example, had high growth rates in the 1950s and
1960s; but more recently, its growth rates have fallen. Al-
though France’s and Germany’s growth rates have not
been as high, the patterns in these countries have been
similar to that in Japan. Countries like the United States,
however, have experienced quite steady growth. Still, Ta-
ble 1 clearly shows that none of these countries has had
a signiﬁcantly positive growth trend over the postwar pe-
riod.
The investment data appear to tell a different story. In
Table 2 are Jones’ (1995) data on average investment/out-
put ratios for producers’ durable equipment.
5 For most
countries, this ratio has increased signiﬁcantly over the
postwar period. For example, in Canada, France, Germa-
ny, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the pro-
ducers’ durables investment rate nearly doubled over the
40-year period. In Japan, meanwhile, the rate nearly tri-
pled. Jones interprets these increases as evidence against
AK-style models since the investment rate increases do not
coincide with increases in GDP growth rates. In fact, for
some countries, the investment rate increases coincide
with decreases in GDP growth rates.
Table 3 shows the postwar average investment rates for
total physical investment (producers’ durable equipment
plus structures). For two countries—Australia and the
United States—this investment rate is roughly constant
over the period. But rates for the other countries display
trends. For some countries, like Germany and the Nether-
lands, signiﬁcant increases in investment occurred in the
1950s and 1960s, followed by signiﬁcant decreases. For
other countries, trends are more persistent. In the United
Kingdom, for example, total investment rose from about
13 percent of GDP in the early 1950s to about 19 percent
in the late 1980s. For Japan, the increase is even greater.
Japan had an investment rate of about 18 percent in the
early 1950s which doubled by the early 1970s. Investment
subsequently fell, but not much; it was still relatively high
in the 1980s.To see these patterns more clearly, consider the data for
the United States and Japan plotted in Charts 1–4. Chart 1
shows annual growth rates for GDP per worker for the
United States; Chart 2, the producers’ durables investment
share of GDP and the total investment share of GDP for
that country. Notice the relative movements in these data.
For the United States, the growth rate and the total invest-
ment rate display no obvious trends, while producers’ du-
rables investment is clearly trending upward.
Japan’s data plots are even more striking. Chart 3
shows Japan’s annual growth rates for GDP per worker.
Between 1950 and 1973, growth rates averaged around 7
percent per year. Between 1973 and 1988, the average fell
to around 3 percent per year. Chart 4 shows Japan’s in-
vestment shares. Unlike the United States, Japan had dra-
matic increases in both producers’ durables investment
and total investment.
Jones (1995) runs a battery of time series tests on the
data for 15 OECD countries to look statistically for trends
in investment rates and growth rates.
6 He ﬁnds empirical
support for positive trends in investment rates—especially
producers’ durable equipment rates—but not in growth
rates. (The United States is the only country for which
Jones ﬁnds no trend in the total investment/output ratio.)
Because Jones generally ﬁnds positive trends in invest-
ment/output ratios and no trends in growth rates, he con-
cludes that the main prediction of AK-style models is not
consistent with the data.
Reevaluating AK Theory
Now I reevaluate AK theory from a different empirical
and theoretical standpoint. Empirically, I consider the in-
vestment and growth evidence over longer time periods
and more countries than Jones does. Theoretically, unlike
Jones, I allow government policy changes to affect select-
ed key factors in the model. These differences with Jones’
analysis lead me to a different conclusion.
Another Look at the Data...
To evaluate the main prediction of AK theory, we need to
look in the data for trends in investment rates and growth
rates. Using only postwardata for countries at similarstag-
es of development is likely to emphasize temporary move-
ments in the data and so hide trends, not reveal them. We
can expand our view: Longer time series are available for
manyofthecountriesthatJonesstudies,anddataareavail-
able for countries at different stages of development. This
broader view reveals the long-run trends that AK theory
predicts.
Historical Data
One obvious way to capture trends is to examine data over
long time horizons. Here, I extend the sample back more
thanacenturytoseeif itcontainsanyrelationship between
trends in investment/output ratios and growth rates. Using
data from Maddison (1992, 1995)
7 for 1870–1989, I ﬁnd
that Jones’ deviations from investment and growth trends
are relatively short-lived, and periods of high investment
rates roughly do coincide with periods of high growth.
In Charts 5–15, I plot 120 years of investment and
growth rates for 11 countries.
8 For the investment/output
ratio, I use gross ﬁxed domestic investment as a percent-
age of GDP valued in current prices. (See Maddison
1992.) For the growth rates, I construct nine-year moving
averages of per capita GDP growth using equal weights
for the current year, four lags, and four leads. (See Maddi-
son 1995, Table D.) This averaging is meant to smooth
out some of the large swings that occurred during the
world wars.
The charts show similar patterns across the 11 coun-
tries plotted. During the prewar period (1870–1914), both
investment and growth rates ﬂuctuate considerably, but for
most countries, they exhibit no persistent deviations from
trends. (One exception is seen in Chart 10; Canada’s do-
mestic investment ratio rose dramatically at the turn of the
century while its growth rate did not. However, Canada’s
foreign investment fell as domestic investment rose, so to-
tal investment in the country does move in parallel with
growth.)
9The charts also show that for most countries, the
war period (1915–49) was a time of major economic dis-
ruption: the charts show huge swings in growth during
that period despite the smoothing of rates. Finally, the
charts show that most of the increases in investment and
growth occurred during the postwar period (1950–89).
This is most evident for the Asian non-OECD countries
(Charts 13–15).
For the OECD countries (Charts 5–12), the same pat-
terns emerge from these data of Maddison as from the da-
ta of Summers and Heston (1991) that Jones analyzes and
that we have seen in Table 1. (One exception is in Chart
12; Maddison’s estimates for Japan show a more moder-
ate increase in the share of investment than do Summers
and Heston’s.) As Jones points out, across these countries,
sometimes investment rates are rising while growth rates
are not. However, as the charts reveal, the deviations from
trends are small relative to year-by-year or even decade-
by-decade movements, and the deviations are not persis-
tent.
Overall, the charts reveal a general upward movement
in both investment rates and growth rates during and after
the world wars. To show that more directly, I display in
Charts 16–18 the averages of the time series plotted in
Charts 5–15 for the three subperiods—before, during, and
after the wars.
Chart 16 shows data for the Western European OECD
countries. Notice that the average growth rates for all of
these countries aretwo or threetimes higher inthe postwar
period than in the prewar period. Similarly, investment
rates are highest in the postwar period. For France and the
United Kingdom, the investment rates are close to twice as
high after the wars as before them. And these rates likely
underestimatetheincreases ininvestmentsincethe datado
not include human capital investment. By most measures,
human capital investment has increased during the 20th
century. (See Mitchell 1981, 1995 and Becker 1993.)
Chart 17 shows averages of investment and growth
ratesinthenon-EuropeanOECDcountriesthatJonesstud-
ies. Here we see the same basic patterns as those for the
Europeans. One exception is the United States. The av-
erage U.S. growth rate is roughly the same in all three pe-
riods between 1870 and 1989. Furthermore, the average
U.S. investment rate is about the same in both the prewar
and postwar periods.
Still, across the OECD countries, the general trends are
clear: higher investment rates correspond to higher growth
rates.Duringtheprewarperiod,averageinvestment/output
ratios for the OECD countries range from about 10 per-
cent to about 20 percent. During the postwar period, mostare higher than 20 percent. Average growth rates, mean-
while, mostly move from about 1 percent to about 2 per-
cent. A striking example of the upward shift in growth
rates is Japan. In the postwar period, Japan’s average an-
nual growth rate is 6 percent, whereas in the prewar peri-
od, it is only 2 percent.
Finally, Chart 18 displays data for three Asian non-
OECD countries that Jones does not study. The data for
these countries show the same familiar pattern. Korea and
Taiwan, like Japan, had phenomenal growth experiences
after World War II, both averaging about 6 percent per
year. Compared to rates in OECD countries, investment
rates in these Asian countries were very low in the prewar
period, but they have increased signiﬁcantly since. India’s
average growth rate dramatically increased from near-zero
levels to nearly 2 percent per year. At the same time, the
investment rate in India nearly tripled.
In summary, Charts 5–18 show that Jones’ negative
conclusion is not supported by the longer time series.
Rather, in 11 countries over the last century, the AK mod-
els’ prediction of simultaneous long-run movements in in-
vestment and growth is conﬁrmed.
Cross-Country Data
Another way to capture trends is to extend the data to
many more countries, to a wider range of development
experiences than that in the relatively advanced OECD
countries. Cross-country averages of such data also reveal
apositivecorrelationbetweeninvestmentratesandgrowth
rates, just as AK models predict.
The data I analyze are from Summers and Heston
1991. I include all countries with available data for the
share of investment in GDP and for GDP per worker. To
avoid eliminating many poor countries, I restrict the sam-
ple to the time period for which most countries have data:
1960–85.
Summers and Heston (1991) have data for 125 coun-
tries during this 26-year period. I sort these countries by
their annualized 25-year growth rates and construct an av-
erage for the ﬁve slowest-growing countries, one for the
ﬁve next-to-slowest–growing countries, and so on. For
each group of countries, then, I construct average invest-
ment/output ratios by ﬁrst constructing an average rate
over the 26-year period for each country and then averag-
ing over the ﬁve countries in the group. This procedure is
meant to illustrate more clearly the pattern between invest-
ment rates and growth rates.
Chart 19 shows the result: a deﬁnite positive correla-
tion between investment rates and growth rates. The slow-
est-growing countries have an average investment rate
around 7 percent. The fastest-growing countries have an
average rate almost four times higher, close to 25 percent.
The correlation among all the average rates is 0.87.
As with the historical time series, these cross-country
data conﬁrm the main prediction of AK-style growth mod-
els. Higher investment rates coincide with higher growth
rates, both across time and across countries.
. . . And the Theory
So far, we have focused on AK models’ predictions of
long-run trends. Now let’s see if this type of model can
account for the short-run deviations in the investment and
growth trends that Jones isolates. To investigate that, we
need to extend the basic theory in such a way as to break
the tight connection between investment and growth de-
rived in equation (14). The connection can be broken sim-
ply by assuming that government policies affect two key
factors: the capital/output ratio and the labor/leisure
choice. The resulting models do predict short-run devia-
tions from trends consistent with the postwar data.
Policies Affecting the Capital/Output Ratio
First, I consider a version of an AK-style model with dif-
ferent tax rates on structures and on producers’ durable
equipment to show that this type of model can predict a
pattern like that Jones ﬁnds: producers’ durables invest-
ment rising, but output growth rates roughly constant.
Consider again the problem of a representative house-
hold choosing consumption and investment to maximize
utility (1). Suppose that now the household earns income
by renting out its capital to ﬁrms. The household has two
types of capital: structures ksand equipment ke. Denote the
investment in structures and equipment as xs and xe, re-
spectively. Suppose also that the income a household re-
ceives is taxed. The budget constraint for the households
in period t is then given by
(15) ct + xst + xet = (1−tst)rstkst + (1−tet)retket + Tt
where rs and re are rental rates on structures and equip-
ment, respectively; ts and te are tax rates on structures and
equipment, respectively; and T is transfer payments to
householdsfromthegovernment.
10Theoptimizationprob-
lem here is to maximize (1) subject to laws of motion for
capital accumulation and the budget constraint in (15). As-
sume that the processes for rs,r e, and T are given.
Now the growth rate can be written in terms of the
equipment investment/output ratio xe/y. If output is given
by y = Ak
a
ek
1
s
−a, then its growth rate is given by
(16) g =1−d + xe/ke
=1−d + A{(1−a)(1−ts)/[a(1−te)]}
1−axe/y
where the ratio of tax rates now enters because the capi-
tal/outputratiodependsonthetaxrates.Noticethatchang-
es in tax rates affect growth indirectly through their effects
on the investment/output ratio and directly through the
term [(1−ts)/(1−te)]
1−a. This simple example shows that
the relationship Jones tests in the simple AK model [equa-
tion (14)] is not a relationship common to all AK models.
In the extended AK model, if tax rates change differential-
ly, then the investment rates for components of investment
do not move in lockstep with the growth rates.
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What about Jones’ (1995) prediction that policy chang-
es having a positive effect on investment/output ratios
should have a positive effect on long-run output growth?
If effective tax rates on equipment were to fall while ef-
fective tax rates on structures rose, this model would pre-
dict an increase in the producers’ durable equipment in-
vestment rate xe/yand a decrease in the ratio (1−ts)/(1−te).
These effects might be roughly offsetting, which would
imply that the growth rate would change little. Further-
more, since the structures investment rate would fall, the
total investment rate would change little.
To determine the exact effect on the growth rate in this
model, we must express the growth rate in terms of inputs
to the model. Suppose that the utility function is given by(17) U(c)=c
1−s/(1−s)
where s is a measure of risk aversion. If we write the
growth rate entirely in terms of ﬁxed parameters and pol-
icy parameters (ts and te), then we have
(18) g = (b{1 − d
+ A[a(1−te)]
a[(1 − a)(1 − ts)]
1−a})
1/s.
Thisexpressiondependsonlyonexogenousfactors,inputs
chosen by the modeler. Policy changes that imply that the
growth rate remains constant are those with the term
(1−te)
a(1−ts)
1−a constant. This occurs when one tax rate
falls and the other rises in such a way as to leave this term
ﬁxed. If one rate falls and the other rises, one investment
rate falls while the other rises. The key, however, is that
total investment does not change much.
This example uses a shift in tax rates favoring equip-
ment investment to produce an increase in the producers’
durable equipment investment rate. This is not merely a
hypothetical example. The United States experienced such
a shift in tax rates with the introduction of the investment
tax credit in 1962, the year that the U.S. producers’ dura-
bles investment rate started to drift upward. (See Chart 2.)
This policy change gave ﬁrms a tax credit that was pro-
portionaltotheirpurchasesofequipmentbutthatcouldnot
be applied to structures. The subsidy changed frequently,
ranging from 0 to 10 percent, and was in effect until 1986.
According to Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1995), the
major U.S. tax reforms enacted in 1962, 1971, 1981, and
1986 had a signiﬁcant positive effect on ﬁrms’ equipment
investment.
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) argue that
more important than tax changes is investment-speciﬁc
technological change favoring equipment. These research-
ers assume that the accumulation equation for equipment
is given by
(19) ket+1 =( 1−d)ket + xetqt
where qt represents the current state of technology for pro-
ducing equipment. In effect, 1/qis the cost in terms of ﬁnal
output of producing a new unit of equipment. A shift in q
here has the same effect as a shift in 1 − te in our model
above. Therefore, taking account of thissort of technologi-
cal change does not change the basic analysis.
12 All we
need to do is substitute q f o r1−te.
We would also predict deviations in equipment invest-
ment rates and output growth rates if the simple one-sector
AK model were extended to allow for two sectors, one for
consumption goods and structures and one for equipment.
Iftheequipment-producingsectorismorecapital-intensive
than the consumption goods sector, then the equipment/
output ratio will rise over time. (For a description of this
version of the two-sector model, see Rebelo 1991.)
What all of these examples show is that the relationship
in (14), which forms the basis of Jones’ (1995) time series
tests, does not generally hold for the AK model.
Policies Affecting the Labor/Leisure Decision
So, in an AK model, growth rates can be constant while
some components of investment are rising. But can the
theoryaccountforcountriesinwhichgrowthratesarecon-
stant or fall while total investment is rising? Yes, the theo-
ry can, in fact, account for different trends in growth and
total investment. The key to the result has to do with how
labor is supplied. Earlier we assumed it was supplied in-
elastically.Nowweallowhouseholdstochoosehowmuch
time to devote to work or leisure. With this assumption,
some policies turn out to have a negative effect on labor
supply, and hence growth, but a positive effect on invest-
ment rates.
Assume that households choose consumption c, invest-
ment in physical capital xk, investment in human capital
xh, and hours of work l to maximize lifetime utility given
by
(20) max{ct,x kt,xht,lt} t=0b
tU(ct,lt)
where l is the fraction of time at work and ¶U(c,l)/¶l <0 .
Also assume that consumption and income can be taxed.
The budget constraint now is given by
(21) (1+tct)ct + xkt + xht = (1−tkt)rtkt + (1−tht)wthtlt + Tt
where ris the rental rate for capital and wis the wage rate.
The proceeds of the taxes on these incomes are used either
to ﬁnance government purchases of goods or for transfer
payments to the households. For the calculations below, I
assume that government purchases are equal to a share sg
of total output.
For this example, total output is given by
(22) y = Ak
a(hl)
1−a
and the equilibrium growth rate on a constant growth path
satisﬁes
(23) g =1−d + xk/k
(24) g =1−d +[ Ak
a(hl)
1−a/k]xk/y
(25) g =1−d + A{(1−a)(1−th)/[a(1−tk)]}
1−al
1−axk/y.
Although the growth rate g in equation (25) does not de-
pend directly on the consumption tax rate tcor on the gov-
ernment share sg,it does depend indirectly on these policy
variables through their effects on the labor input and the
investment rate.
Toderiveamorereduced-formrelationshipbetweenin-
vestment rates and growth rates, we must specify a func-
tional form for preferences. Assume that
(26) U(c,l)=[ c(1 − l)
y]
1−s/(1−s)
which is the same function used earlier if y = 0. From the
ﬁrst-order conditions of the household’s maximization
problem, we can show that on the constant growth path,
the labor supply is related to the growth rate as follows:
(27) l =[ g
s − b(1−d)]
1/(1−a) ×
{[a(1−tk)]
−a/(1−a)/[(bA)
1/(1−a)(1−a)(1−th)]}.
Holding tk and th ﬁxed, we can see that policies which
have a positive effect on the growth rate must also have a
positive effect on the labor supply since ¶l/¶g >0 .I fw e
substitute (27) into (25) and the analog of the human capi-tal accumulation equation, then we can also derive rela-
tionships between the investment rates and the growth rate
as follows:
(28) xk/y ={ ( g −1+d)/[g
s − b(1−d)]}ba(1−tk)
(29) xh/y ={ ( g −1+d)/[g
s − b(1−d)]}b(1−a)(1−th).
Taking the derivatives of (28) and (29) with respect to the
growth rate g (with tk and th held ﬁxed) gives ¶(xk/y)/¶g<
0 and ¶(xh/y)/¶g <0 ,i fs > 1 (that is, if households are
sufficiently averse to risk). In other words, these relation-
ships imply that policy changes having a negative impact
on growth (with tax rates tk and th held constant) have a
negativeimpactonthelaborinputandapositiveimpacton
both investment rates. We can, therefore, construct exam-
plesinwhichtheinvestmentratesrise,thelaborinputfalls,
and the growth rate falls.
For example, suppose the consumption tax rate tc in-
creases. Such a policy change causes households to shift
their purchases from consumption to investment, which is
why the investment rates rise. The tax also has a negative
impact on employment and, thus, on growth.
For another example, suppose, instead, that the ratio of
government consumption to output sg falls. The fall in
spending acts like a positive wealth effect that increases
consumption and leisure. Thus, households work less, and
the growth rate falls. Purchases of investment fall, but out-
put falls more. Therefore, as equations (28) and (29) show,
the investment rates rise as the growth rate falls. If factor
tax rates are also changing, then the changes in investment
rates and growth rates could potentially be larger since
theyareaffectedindirectlybychangesinthecapital/output
ratio.
The consumption tax rate and the government share of
total spending are two examples of policy variables that
have an indirect effect on growth rates through their effect
onthelaborsupplydecision.Clearly,theseexamplesshow
that ignoring changes in labor supply may lead to the
wrong inferences. Countries such as France, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom have all experienced sig-
niﬁcant decreases in their labor inputs over the postwar
period.
13 These countries have also had increases in their
investment rates during the 1950s and 1960s with no com-
parable increase in growth rates.
Cooley and Ohanian (1997) estimate the effects of al-
ternativegovernmentpoliciesfortheUnitedKingdomover
thepostwarperiod.Theirbenchmarkmodelisatwo-sector
version of the extended model we have considered. They
show that their model ﬁts the data on investment and
growth remarkably well. But unlike Jones, they do not ig-
nore the effects that policies have on capital/output ratios
and labor inputs.
The examples of this section demonstrate that the rela-
tionship between investment and growth that Jones (1995)
tests [equation (14)] is not a relationship generic to AK
models.InhissimpleAKmodel,Jonesignoresthefactthat
some policy changes affect the capital/output ratio as well
as the investment/output ratio. Jones also ignores the ef-
fects of many policy changes because he assumes that
labor is inelastically supplied. By not ignoring these ef-
fects, I have shown, at least over short horizons, that more
than one possible pattern in growth and investment is
consistent with an AK-style endogenous growth model—
including the patterns observed for the OECD countries in
the post–World War II period.
Of course, these results should not be interpreted to
mean thatanything ispossible. As wehave seen,over long
horizons,AK-stylemodelsdopredictthatcountriesfollow-
ing policies promoting investment should have high
growth rates. In the historical and cross-country data, this
is exactly what we see.
Conclusion
My work here is in large part a reaction to critiques of AK
theory that are based on fragile predictions of the models
and movements in the investment/output ratio and output
growth rates over short samples. I have presented data on
the investment share and GDP growth and argued that the
key prediction of AK theory is consistent with the data
when versions of the model and the data are compared ap-
propriately.
But I have taken only one necessary step in defending
AK theory. Showing that the theory does not appear to be
inconsistent with the available data falls short of showing
that the theory’s quantitative implications are in line with
observations. Further work is needed to deﬁnitively estab-
lish that AK theory is a good theory of growth—or to de-
ﬁnitively dismiss it.
*The author thanks Nurlan Turdaliev for assistance on this project and Andy
Atkeson, Hal Cole, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, and Warren Weber for very helpful
comments.
1The name AK comes from the simplest form of the models’ production function
in the simplest case, namely, Y = AK. Here A is a positive constant representing the
economy’s level of technology and K is the economy’s stock of capital.
2For reviews, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 and Aghion and Howitt 1998.
3For more details about two-sector endogenous growth models, see Lucas 1988,
1990; King and Rebelo 1990; Rebelo 1991; Kim 1992; Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
1993; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Stokey and Rebelo 1995; Jones and Manuelli
1997; and McGrattan and Schmitz 1998.
4Jones (1995) also includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway,
and Sweden, all of which have similar investment and growth experiences as the coun-
tries reported in Tables 1–3. Here, I report statistics for the smaller set of countries that
have more historical data available than Jones examines.
5Jones focuses on producers’ durable equipment because this component has been
found to be strongly correlated with growth in cross-country regressions. See De Long
and Summers 1991. The data in Table 2 were constructed by Robert Summers. See the
appendix in Jones 1995.
6In particular, Jones (1995) tests for unit roots in the time series data. A process
zt is called a unit root if its ﬁrst difference zt −z t−1 is stationary. A common test for
unit roots is that proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979), who estimate the regression
equation zt =µ+rzt−1 + B(L)Dzt−1 + et and test the hypothesis that r = 1, where µ is
a constant, Dzt = zt −z t−1, B(L)=B1+ B2L +...+BqL
q−1, L is a lag operator (that is,
Lzt = zt−1), and et is a stochastic process that is uncorrelated over time and has a mean
of zero.
7The statistical appendix for Maddison’s 1992 paper is Maddison 1991.
8Labor force data are not available before 1950, so I report per capita rather than
per worker growth.
9See Maddison 1992, which also reports gross national saving as a percentage of
GDP. For the other countries, there are no noticeable differences in the trend patterns
of gross domestic investment and gross national saving.
10The results are the same if we assume that investment in structures or equipment
is taxed.
11Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) test whether the data are better described by an en-
dogenous or anexogenous growth model.Unlike Jones(1995), they explicitlyincorpo-
rate ﬁscal variables in their time series regressions.
12Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) generate growth by exogenous
changes in technology. The example here generates long-run growth by capital accu-
mulation. However, temporary changes in either tax rates or technology will imply
temporary changes in growth rates from their long-run trend, as is true in the exoge-
nous growth model.
13Maddison (1995) reports population, total employment, and annual hours of
work per employed persons for various dates between 1870 and 1992. These series can
be used to estimate the changes in the labor input.References
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nomics 106 (May): 327–68.Tables 1–3 The Evidence Jones Uses Against AK Models
5-Year Annualized Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product per Worker (%)
and Average Investment Shares of Gross Domestic Product (%), 1950–89
Values for Countries
United United
Variables Years Australia Canada France Germany Japan Netherlands Kingdom States
Table 1 1950–54 1.83 2.42 4.02 8.32 6.74 4.31 2.82 2.64
Growth Rates 1955–59 1.82 1.42 4.76 4.93 6.81 3.96 1.94 .92
per Worker 1960–64 1.98 2.69 4.79 4.42 7.97 3.80 2.44 2.80
1965–69 3.49 2.29 4.87 4.22 9.47 4.26 2.20 1.67
1970–74 .60 1.89 1.98 1.89 3.03 1.53 1.35 –.22
1975–79 .97 .99 2.39 3.16 4.01 1.29 1.38 1.02
1980–84 1.21 1.63 .19 –.02 2.94 –.46 1.58 1.28
1985–89 .92 1.99 2.32 1.60 3.75 1.81 3.09 1.71
Table 2 1950–54 8.14 3.06 4.34 4.81 3.37 6.34 4.79 4.43
Producers’ 1955–59 7.86 2.88 5.14 5.51 3.82 8.22 5.47 4.26
Durables 1960–64 9.24 2.56 6.27 6.84 5.57 8.89 6.04 4.23
Investment 1965–69 10.02 3.15 6.88 6.85 6.03 9.17 6.55 5.23
Shares 1970–74 8.91 3.39 8.09 7.75 7.42 9.37 6.91 5.38
1975–79 8.34 3.84 7.97 7.32 6.44 7.34 6.86 5.87
1980–84 9.33 5.03 7.89 7.57 7.47 6.65 6.63 6.15
1985–89 9.51 5.69 8.05 8.13 9.81 8.65 7.49 7.21
Table 3 1950–54 26.5 24.0 20.1 27.5 18.2 22.8 13.2 24.0
Total Physical 1955–59 27.1 26.0 22.8 31.0 21.2 25.2 15.5 23.7
Investment 1960–64 28.3 22.4 25.3 30.8 28.1 26.5 17.3 22.5
Shares 1965–69 28.9 23.1 26.8 28.8 30.6 27.0 18.6 23.0
1970–74 28.4 22.7 29.6 28.9 36.9 27.3 19.5 22.9
1975–79 27.1 23.9 27.1 25.8 34.2 23.6 18.5 22.9
1980–84 27.2 24.0 25.0 24.7 32.6 20.4 15.8 22.5
1985–89 27.0 26.5 25.1 23.4 33.7 22.0 18.7 23.0
Sources: Tables 1 and 3, Summers and Heston 1991 and Penn World Table, Mark 5.6
(http://www.nber.org/pwt56.html); Table 2, Robert Summers (Jones 1995, p. 506)Charts 1–4     Another Look at Jones
,
 Evidence
Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product per Worker
and Investment as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1950–92
Chart 1
Chart 2
Sources: Summers and Heston 1991, Penn World Table, Mark 5.6
               (http://www.nber.org/pwt56.html); Robert Summers (Jones 1995, p. 506)
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Charts 5–15     A Longer Look Back at Investment and Growth
Gross Fixed Domestic Investment as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
and Growth Rate of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (9-Year Moving Average)
During 1870–1989 in 11 Countries
Charts 5–8     In Western European OECD Countries . . .
Chart 5     France
Chart 7     Netherlands
Sources: Maddison 1992, 1995
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Charts 9–12     . . . In Non-European OECD Countries . . .
Chart 9     Australia
Chart 11     United States
Chart 10     Canada
Chart 12     JapanCharts 13–15     . . . And in Asian Non-OECD Countries
Chart 13     India
Chart 15     Taiwan
Chart 14     Korea
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Chart 16–18     The Long-Run Trends
Gross Fixed Domestic Investment's Average Annual Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
and Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product
During Three Periods of 1870–1989 in 11 Countries
Chart 16     In Western European OECD Countries . . .
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n.a. n.a.Chart 18     . . .  And in Asian Non-OECD Countries
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n.a.Chart 19     The Cross-Country Relationship
                Between Investment and Growth
Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product per Worker
and Investment Share of Gross Domestic Product for 125 Countries,
Ranked by Annualized 25-Year Growth Rates,
Then Averaged in Groups of Five, 1960–85
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Source: Summers and Heston 1991
5
10
15
20
25
– 20246 –1 1 3 5 7